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Allow render HTML with css/js external links (#19017)

* Allow render HTML with css/js external links

* Fix bug because of filename escape chars

* Fix lint

* Update docs about new configuration item

* Fix bug of render HTML in sub directory

* Add CSP head for displaying iframe in rendering file

* Fix test

* Apply suggestions from code review

Co-authored-by: delvh <dev.lh@web.de>

* Some improvements

* some improvement

* revert change in SanitizerDisabled of external renderer

* Add sandbox for iframe and support allow-scripts and allow-same-origin

* refactor

* fix

* fix lint

* fine tune

* use single option RENDER_CONTENT_MODE, use sandbox=allow-scripts

* fine tune CSP

* Apply suggestions from code review

Co-authored-by: wxiaoguang <wxiaoguang@gmail.com>

Co-authored-by: delvh <dev.lh@web.de>
Co-authored-by: wxiaoguang <wxiaoguang@gmail.com>
This commit is contained in:
Lunny Xiao 2022-06-16 11:33:23 +08:00 committed by GitHub
parent 7d1770cd71
commit b01dce2a6e
No known key found for this signature in database
GPG key ID: 4AEE18F83AFDEB23
17 changed files with 248 additions and 93 deletions

View file

@ -2181,8 +2181,11 @@ PATH =
;RENDER_COMMAND = "asciidoc --out-file=- -"
;; Don't pass the file on STDIN, pass the filename as argument instead.
;IS_INPUT_FILE = false
; Don't filter html tags and attributes if true
;DISABLE_SANITIZER = false
;; How the content will be rendered.
;; * sanitized: Sanitize the content and render it inside current page, default to only allow a few HTML tags and attributes. Customized sanitizer rules can be defined in [markup.sanitizer.*] .
;; * no-sanitizer: Disable the sanitizer and render the content inside current page. It's **insecure** and may lead to XSS attack if the content contains malicious code.
;; * iframe: Render the content in a separate standalone page and embed it into current page by iframe. The iframe is in sandbox mode with same-origin disabled, and the JS code are safely isolated from parent page.
;RENDER_CONTENT_MODE=sanitized
;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;
;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;

View file

@ -1026,13 +1026,16 @@ IS_INPUT_FILE = false
command. Multiple extensions needs a comma as splitter.
- RENDER\_COMMAND: External command to render all matching extensions.
- IS\_INPUT\_FILE: **false** Input is not a standard input but a file param followed `RENDER_COMMAND`.
- DISABLE_SANITIZER: **false** Don't filter html tags and attributes if true. Don't change this to true except you know what that means.
- RENDER_CONTENT_MODE: **sanitized** How the content will be rendered.
- sanitized: Sanitize the content and render it inside current page, default to only allow a few HTML tags and attributes. Customized sanitizer rules can be defined in `[markup.sanitizer.*]`.
- no-sanitizer: Disable the sanitizer and render the content inside current page. It's **insecure** and may lead to XSS attack if the content contains malicious code.
- iframe: Render the content in a separate standalone page and embed it into current page by iframe. The iframe is in sandbox mode with same-origin disabled, and the JS code are safely isolated from parent page.
Two special environment variables are passed to the render command:
- `GITEA_PREFIX_SRC`, which contains the current URL prefix in the `src` path tree. To be used as prefix for links.
- `GITEA_PREFIX_RAW`, which contains the current URL prefix in the `raw` path tree. To be used as prefix for image paths.
If `DISABLE_SANITIZER` is false, Gitea supports customizing the sanitization policy for rendered HTML. The example below will support KaTeX output from pandoc.
If `RENDER_CONTENT_MODE` is `sanitized`, Gitea supports customizing the sanitization policy for rendered HTML. The example below will support KaTeX output from pandoc.
```ini
[markup.sanitizer.TeX]

View file

@ -318,14 +318,17 @@ IS_INPUT_FILE = false
- FILE_EXTENSIONS: 关联的文档的扩展名,多个扩展名用都好分隔。
- RENDER_COMMAND: 工具的命令行命令及参数。
- IS_INPUT_FILE: 输入方式是最后一个参数为文件路径还是从标准输入读取。
- DISABLE_SANITIZER: **false** 如果为 true 则不过滤 HTML 标签和属性。除非你知道这意味着什么,否则不要设置为 true。
- RENDER_CONTENT_MODE: **sanitized** 内容如何被渲染。
- sanitized: 对内容进行净化并渲染到当前页面中,仅有一部分 HTML 标签和属性是被允许的。
- no-sanitizer: 禁用净化器,把内容渲染到当前页面中。此模式是**不安全**的,如果内容中含有恶意代码,可能会导致 XSS 攻击。
- iframe: 把内容渲染在一个独立的页面中并使用 iframe 嵌入到当前页面中。使用的 iframe 工作在沙箱模式并禁用了同源请求JS 代码被安全的从父页面中隔离出去。
以下两个环境变量将会被传递给渲染命令:
- `GITEA_PREFIX_SRC`:包含当前的`src`路径的URL前缀可以被用于链接的前缀。
- `GITEA_PREFIX_RAW`:包含当前的`raw`路径的URL前缀可以被用于图片的前缀。
如果 `DISABLE_SANITIZER` 为 false,则 Gitea 支持自定义渲染 HTML 的净化策略。以下例子将用 pandoc 支持 KaTeX 输出。
如果 `RENDER_CONTENT_MODE` 为 `sanitized`,则 Gitea 支持自定义渲染 HTML 的净化策略。以下例子将用 pandoc 支持 KaTeX 输出。
```ini
[markup.sanitizer.TeX]

View file

@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ func CreateReaderAndDetermineDelimiter(ctx *markup.RenderContext, rd io.Reader)
func determineDelimiter(ctx *markup.RenderContext, data []byte) rune {
extension := ".csv"
if ctx != nil {
extension = strings.ToLower(filepath.Ext(ctx.Filename))
extension = strings.ToLower(filepath.Ext(ctx.RelativePath))
}
var delimiter rune

View file

@ -230,7 +230,7 @@ John Doe john@doe.com This,note,had,a,lot,of,commas,to,test,delimiters`,
}
for n, c := range cases {
delimiter := determineDelimiter(&markup.RenderContext{Filename: c.filename}, []byte(decodeSlashes(t, c.csv)))
delimiter := determineDelimiter(&markup.RenderContext{RelativePath: c.filename}, []byte(decodeSlashes(t, c.csv)))
assert.EqualValues(t, c.expectedDelimiter, delimiter, "case %d: delimiter should be equal, expected '%c' got '%c'", n, c.expectedDelimiter, delimiter)
}
}

View file

@ -33,9 +33,6 @@ func (Renderer) Name() string {
return MarkupName
}
// NeedPostProcess implements markup.Renderer
func (Renderer) NeedPostProcess() bool { return false }
// Extensions implements markup.Renderer
func (Renderer) Extensions() []string {
return []string{".sh-session"}
@ -48,11 +45,6 @@ func (Renderer) SanitizerRules() []setting.MarkupSanitizerRule {
}
}
// SanitizerDisabled disabled sanitize if return true
func (Renderer) SanitizerDisabled() bool {
return false
}
// CanRender implements markup.RendererContentDetector
func (Renderer) CanRender(filename string, input io.Reader) bool {
buf, err := io.ReadAll(input)

View file

@ -29,9 +29,6 @@ func (Renderer) Name() string {
return "csv"
}
// NeedPostProcess implements markup.Renderer
func (Renderer) NeedPostProcess() bool { return false }
// Extensions implements markup.Renderer
func (Renderer) Extensions() []string {
return []string{".csv", ".tsv"}
@ -46,11 +43,6 @@ func (Renderer) SanitizerRules() []setting.MarkupSanitizerRule {
}
}
// SanitizerDisabled disabled sanitize if return true
func (Renderer) SanitizerDisabled() bool {
return false
}
func writeField(w io.Writer, element, class, field string) error {
if _, err := io.WriteString(w, "<"); err != nil {
return err

View file

@ -34,6 +34,11 @@ type Renderer struct {
*setting.MarkupRenderer
}
var (
_ markup.PostProcessRenderer = (*Renderer)(nil)
_ markup.ExternalRenderer = (*Renderer)(nil)
)
// Name returns the external tool name
func (p *Renderer) Name() string {
return p.MarkupName
@ -56,7 +61,12 @@ func (p *Renderer) SanitizerRules() []setting.MarkupSanitizerRule {
// SanitizerDisabled disabled sanitize if return true
func (p *Renderer) SanitizerDisabled() bool {
return p.DisableSanitizer
return p.RenderContentMode == setting.RenderContentModeNoSanitizer || p.RenderContentMode == setting.RenderContentModeIframe
}
// DisplayInIFrame represents whether render the content with an iframe
func (p *Renderer) DisplayInIFrame() bool {
return p.RenderContentMode == setting.RenderContentModeIframe
}
func envMark(envName string) string {

View file

@ -29,10 +29,10 @@ func TestRender_Commits(t *testing.T) {
setting.AppURL = TestAppURL
test := func(input, expected string) {
buffer, err := RenderString(&RenderContext{
Ctx: git.DefaultContext,
Filename: ".md",
URLPrefix: TestRepoURL,
Metas: localMetas,
Ctx: git.DefaultContext,
RelativePath: ".md",
URLPrefix: TestRepoURL,
Metas: localMetas,
}, input)
assert.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, strings.TrimSpace(expected), strings.TrimSpace(buffer))
@ -80,9 +80,9 @@ func TestRender_CrossReferences(t *testing.T) {
test := func(input, expected string) {
buffer, err := RenderString(&RenderContext{
Filename: "a.md",
URLPrefix: setting.AppSubURL,
Metas: localMetas,
RelativePath: "a.md",
URLPrefix: setting.AppSubURL,
Metas: localMetas,
}, input)
assert.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, strings.TrimSpace(expected), strings.TrimSpace(buffer))
@ -124,8 +124,8 @@ func TestRender_links(t *testing.T) {
test := func(input, expected string) {
buffer, err := RenderString(&RenderContext{
Filename: "a.md",
URLPrefix: TestRepoURL,
RelativePath: "a.md",
URLPrefix: TestRepoURL,
}, input)
assert.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, strings.TrimSpace(expected), strings.TrimSpace(buffer))
@ -223,8 +223,8 @@ func TestRender_email(t *testing.T) {
test := func(input, expected string) {
res, err := RenderString(&RenderContext{
Filename: "a.md",
URLPrefix: TestRepoURL,
RelativePath: "a.md",
URLPrefix: TestRepoURL,
}, input)
assert.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, strings.TrimSpace(expected), strings.TrimSpace(res))
@ -281,8 +281,8 @@ func TestRender_emoji(t *testing.T) {
test := func(input, expected string) {
expected = strings.ReplaceAll(expected, "&", "&amp;")
buffer, err := RenderString(&RenderContext{
Filename: "a.md",
URLPrefix: TestRepoURL,
RelativePath: "a.md",
URLPrefix: TestRepoURL,
}, input)
assert.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, strings.TrimSpace(expected), strings.TrimSpace(buffer))

View file

@ -205,12 +205,14 @@ func init() {
// Renderer implements markup.Renderer
type Renderer struct{}
var _ markup.PostProcessRenderer = (*Renderer)(nil)
// Name implements markup.Renderer
func (Renderer) Name() string {
return MarkupName
}
// NeedPostProcess implements markup.Renderer
// NeedPostProcess implements markup.PostProcessRenderer
func (Renderer) NeedPostProcess() bool { return true }
// Extensions implements markup.Renderer
@ -223,11 +225,6 @@ func (Renderer) SanitizerRules() []setting.MarkupSanitizerRule {
return []setting.MarkupSanitizerRule{}
}
// SanitizerDisabled disabled sanitize if return true
func (Renderer) SanitizerDisabled() bool {
return false
}
// Render implements markup.Renderer
func (Renderer) Render(ctx *markup.RenderContext, input io.Reader, output io.Writer) error {
return render(ctx, input, output)

View file

@ -29,12 +29,14 @@ func init() {
// Renderer implements markup.Renderer for orgmode
type Renderer struct{}
var _ markup.PostProcessRenderer = (*Renderer)(nil)
// Name implements markup.Renderer
func (Renderer) Name() string {
return "orgmode"
}
// NeedPostProcess implements markup.Renderer
// NeedPostProcess implements markup.PostProcessRenderer
func (Renderer) NeedPostProcess() bool { return true }
// Extensions implements markup.Renderer
@ -47,11 +49,6 @@ func (Renderer) SanitizerRules() []setting.MarkupSanitizerRule {
return []setting.MarkupSanitizerRule{}
}
// SanitizerDisabled disabled sanitize if return true
func (Renderer) SanitizerDisabled() bool {
return false
}
// Render renders orgmode rawbytes to HTML
func Render(ctx *markup.RenderContext, input io.Reader, output io.Writer) error {
htmlWriter := org.NewHTMLWriter()

View file

@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ import (
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"net/url"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"sync"
@ -43,17 +44,18 @@ type Header struct {
// RenderContext represents a render context
type RenderContext struct {
Ctx context.Context
Filename string
Type string
IsWiki bool
URLPrefix string
Metas map[string]string
DefaultLink string
GitRepo *git.Repository
ShaExistCache map[string]bool
cancelFn func()
TableOfContents []Header
Ctx context.Context
RelativePath string // relative path from tree root of the branch
Type string
IsWiki bool
URLPrefix string
Metas map[string]string
DefaultLink string
GitRepo *git.Repository
ShaExistCache map[string]bool
cancelFn func()
TableOfContents []Header
InStandalonePage bool // used by external render. the router "/org/repo/render/..." will output the rendered content in a standalone page
}
// Cancel runs any cleanup functions that have been registered for this Ctx
@ -88,12 +90,24 @@ func (ctx *RenderContext) AddCancel(fn func()) {
type Renderer interface {
Name() string // markup format name
Extensions() []string
NeedPostProcess() bool
SanitizerRules() []setting.MarkupSanitizerRule
SanitizerDisabled() bool
Render(ctx *RenderContext, input io.Reader, output io.Writer) error
}
// PostProcessRenderer defines an interface for renderers who need post process
type PostProcessRenderer interface {
NeedPostProcess() bool
}
// PostProcessRenderer defines an interface for external renderers
type ExternalRenderer interface {
// SanitizerDisabled disabled sanitize if return true
SanitizerDisabled() bool
// DisplayInIFrame represents whether render the content with an iframe
DisplayInIFrame() bool
}
// RendererContentDetector detects if the content can be rendered
// by specified renderer
type RendererContentDetector interface {
@ -142,7 +156,7 @@ func DetectRendererType(filename string, input io.Reader) string {
func Render(ctx *RenderContext, input io.Reader, output io.Writer) error {
if ctx.Type != "" {
return renderByType(ctx, input, output)
} else if ctx.Filename != "" {
} else if ctx.RelativePath != "" {
return renderFile(ctx, input, output)
}
return errors.New("Render options both filename and type missing")
@ -163,6 +177,27 @@ type nopCloser struct {
func (nopCloser) Close() error { return nil }
func renderIFrame(ctx *RenderContext, output io.Writer) error {
// set height="0" ahead, otherwise the scrollHeight would be max(150, realHeight)
// at the moment, only "allow-scripts" is allowed for sandbox mode.
// "allow-same-origin" should never be used, it leads to XSS attack, and it makes the JS in iframe can access parent window's config and CSRF token
// TODO: when using dark theme, if the rendered content doesn't have proper style, the default text color is black, which is not easy to read
_, err := io.WriteString(output, fmt.Sprintf(`
<iframe src="%s/%s/%s/render/%s/%s"
name="giteaExternalRender"
onload="this.height=giteaExternalRender.document.documentElement.scrollHeight"
width="100%%" height="0" scrolling="no" frameborder="0" style="overflow: hidden"
sandbox="allow-scripts"
></iframe>`,
setting.AppSubURL,
url.PathEscape(ctx.Metas["user"]),
url.PathEscape(ctx.Metas["repo"]),
ctx.Metas["BranchNameSubURL"],
url.PathEscape(ctx.RelativePath),
))
return err
}
func render(ctx *RenderContext, renderer Renderer, input io.Reader, output io.Writer) error {
var wg sync.WaitGroup
var err error
@ -175,7 +210,12 @@ func render(ctx *RenderContext, renderer Renderer, input io.Reader, output io.Wr
var pr2 io.ReadCloser
var pw2 io.WriteCloser
if !renderer.SanitizerDisabled() {
var sanitizerDisabled bool
if r, ok := renderer.(ExternalRenderer); ok {
sanitizerDisabled = r.SanitizerDisabled()
}
if !sanitizerDisabled {
pr2, pw2 = io.Pipe()
defer func() {
_ = pr2.Close()
@ -194,7 +234,7 @@ func render(ctx *RenderContext, renderer Renderer, input io.Reader, output io.Wr
wg.Add(1)
go func() {
if renderer.NeedPostProcess() {
if r, ok := renderer.(PostProcessRenderer); ok && r.NeedPostProcess() {
err = PostProcess(ctx, pr, pw2)
} else {
_, err = io.Copy(pw2, pr)
@ -239,8 +279,15 @@ func (err ErrUnsupportedRenderExtension) Error() string {
}
func renderFile(ctx *RenderContext, input io.Reader, output io.Writer) error {
extension := strings.ToLower(filepath.Ext(ctx.Filename))
extension := strings.ToLower(filepath.Ext(ctx.RelativePath))
if renderer, ok := extRenderers[extension]; ok {
if r, ok := renderer.(ExternalRenderer); ok && r.DisplayInIFrame() {
if !ctx.InStandalonePage {
// for an external render, it could only output its content in a standalone page
// otherwise, a <iframe> should be outputted to embed the external rendered page
return renderIFrame(ctx, output)
}
}
return render(ctx, renderer, input, output)
}
return ErrUnsupportedRenderExtension{extension}

View file

@ -20,6 +20,12 @@ var (
MermaidMaxSourceCharacters int
)
const (
RenderContentModeSanitized = "sanitized"
RenderContentModeNoSanitizer = "no-sanitizer"
RenderContentModeIframe = "iframe"
)
// MarkupRenderer defines the external parser configured in ini
type MarkupRenderer struct {
Enabled bool
@ -29,7 +35,7 @@ type MarkupRenderer struct {
IsInputFile bool
NeedPostProcess bool
MarkupSanitizerRules []MarkupSanitizerRule
DisableSanitizer bool
RenderContentMode string
}
// MarkupSanitizerRule defines the policy for whitelisting attributes on
@ -144,13 +150,28 @@ func newMarkupRenderer(name string, sec *ini.Section) {
return
}
if sec.HasKey("DISABLE_SANITIZER") {
log.Error("Deprecated setting `[markup.*]` `DISABLE_SANITIZER` present. This fallback will be removed in v1.18.0")
}
renderContentMode := sec.Key("RENDER_CONTENT_MODE").MustString(RenderContentModeSanitized)
if !sec.HasKey("RENDER_CONTENT_MODE") && sec.Key("DISABLE_SANITIZER").MustBool(false) {
renderContentMode = RenderContentModeNoSanitizer // if only the legacy DISABLE_SANITIZER exists, use it
}
if renderContentMode != RenderContentModeSanitized &&
renderContentMode != RenderContentModeNoSanitizer &&
renderContentMode != RenderContentModeIframe {
log.Error("invalid RENDER_CONTENT_MODE: %q, default to %q", renderContentMode, RenderContentModeSanitized)
renderContentMode = RenderContentModeSanitized
}
ExternalMarkupRenderers = append(ExternalMarkupRenderers, &MarkupRenderer{
Enabled: sec.Key("ENABLED").MustBool(false),
MarkupName: name,
FileExtensions: exts,
Command: command,
IsInputFile: sec.Key("IS_INPUT_FILE").MustBool(false),
NeedPostProcess: sec.Key("NEED_POSTPROCESS").MustBool(true),
DisableSanitizer: sec.Key("DISABLE_SANITIZER").MustBool(false),
Enabled: sec.Key("ENABLED").MustBool(false),
MarkupName: name,
FileExtensions: exts,
Command: command,
IsInputFile: sec.Key("IS_INPUT_FILE").MustBool(false),
NeedPostProcess: sec.Key("NEED_POSTPROCESS").MustBool(true),
RenderContentMode: renderContentMode,
})
}

View file

@ -139,7 +139,7 @@ func setCsvCompareContext(ctx *context.Context) {
return csvReader, reader, err
}
baseReader, baseBlobCloser, err := csvReaderFromCommit(&markup.RenderContext{Ctx: ctx, Filename: diffFile.OldName}, baseCommit)
baseReader, baseBlobCloser, err := csvReaderFromCommit(&markup.RenderContext{Ctx: ctx, RelativePath: diffFile.OldName}, baseCommit)
if baseBlobCloser != nil {
defer baseBlobCloser.Close()
}
@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ func setCsvCompareContext(ctx *context.Context) {
return CsvDiffResult{nil, "unable to load file from base commit"}
}
headReader, headBlobCloser, err := csvReaderFromCommit(&markup.RenderContext{Ctx: ctx, Filename: diffFile.Name}, headCommit)
headReader, headBlobCloser, err := csvReaderFromCommit(&markup.RenderContext{Ctx: ctx, RelativePath: diffFile.Name}, headCommit)
if headBlobCloser != nil {
defer headBlobCloser.Close()
}

View file

@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
// Copyright 2022 The Gitea Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a MIT-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
package repo
import (
"bytes"
"io"
"net/http"
"path"
"code.gitea.io/gitea/modules/charset"
"code.gitea.io/gitea/modules/context"
"code.gitea.io/gitea/modules/git"
"code.gitea.io/gitea/modules/markup"
"code.gitea.io/gitea/modules/typesniffer"
"code.gitea.io/gitea/modules/util"
)
// RenderFile renders a file by repos path
func RenderFile(ctx *context.Context) {
blob, err := ctx.Repo.Commit.GetBlobByPath(ctx.Repo.TreePath)
if err != nil {
if git.IsErrNotExist(err) {
ctx.NotFound("GetBlobByPath", err)
} else {
ctx.ServerError("GetBlobByPath", err)
}
return
}
dataRc, err := blob.DataAsync()
if err != nil {
ctx.ServerError("DataAsync", err)
return
}
defer dataRc.Close()
buf := make([]byte, 1024)
n, _ := util.ReadAtMost(dataRc, buf)
buf = buf[:n]
st := typesniffer.DetectContentType(buf)
isTextFile := st.IsText()
rd := charset.ToUTF8WithFallbackReader(io.MultiReader(bytes.NewReader(buf), dataRc))
if markupType := markup.Type(blob.Name()); markupType == "" {
if isTextFile {
_, err = io.Copy(ctx.Resp, rd)
if err != nil {
ctx.ServerError("Copy", err)
}
return
}
ctx.Error(http.StatusInternalServerError, "Unsupported file type render")
return
}
treeLink := ctx.Repo.RepoLink + "/src/" + ctx.Repo.BranchNameSubURL()
if ctx.Repo.TreePath != "" {
treeLink += "/" + util.PathEscapeSegments(ctx.Repo.TreePath)
}
ctx.Resp.Header().Add("Content-Security-Policy", "frame-src 'self'; sandbox allow-scripts")
err = markup.Render(&markup.RenderContext{
Ctx: ctx,
RelativePath: ctx.Repo.TreePath,
URLPrefix: path.Dir(treeLink),
Metas: ctx.Repo.Repository.ComposeDocumentMetas(),
GitRepo: ctx.Repo.GitRepo,
InStandalonePage: true,
}, rd, ctx.Resp)
if err != nil {
ctx.ServerError("Render", err)
return
}
}

View file

@ -356,11 +356,11 @@ func renderReadmeFile(ctx *context.Context, readmeFile *namedBlob, readmeTreelin
ctx.Data["MarkupType"] = string(markupType)
var result strings.Builder
err := markup.Render(&markup.RenderContext{
Ctx: ctx,
Filename: readmeFile.name,
URLPrefix: readmeTreelink,
Metas: ctx.Repo.Repository.ComposeDocumentMetas(),
GitRepo: ctx.Repo.GitRepo,
Ctx: ctx,
RelativePath: ctx.Repo.TreePath,
URLPrefix: readmeTreelink,
Metas: ctx.Repo.Repository.ComposeDocumentMetas(),
GitRepo: ctx.Repo.GitRepo,
}, rd, &result)
if err != nil {
log.Error("Render failed: %v then fallback", err)
@ -528,18 +528,22 @@ func renderFile(ctx *context.Context, entry *git.TreeEntry, treeLink, rawLink st
if !detected {
markupType = ""
}
metas := ctx.Repo.Repository.ComposeDocumentMetas()
metas["BranchNameSubURL"] = ctx.Repo.BranchNameSubURL()
err := markup.Render(&markup.RenderContext{
Ctx: ctx,
Type: markupType,
Filename: blob.Name(),
URLPrefix: path.Dir(treeLink),
Metas: ctx.Repo.Repository.ComposeDocumentMetas(),
GitRepo: ctx.Repo.GitRepo,
Ctx: ctx,
Type: markupType,
RelativePath: ctx.Repo.TreePath,
URLPrefix: path.Dir(treeLink),
Metas: metas,
GitRepo: ctx.Repo.GitRepo,
}, rd, &result)
if err != nil {
ctx.ServerError("Render", err)
return
}
// to prevent iframe load third-party url
ctx.Resp.Header().Add("Content-Security-Policy", "frame-src 'self'")
ctx.Data["EscapeStatus"], ctx.Data["FileContent"] = charset.EscapeControlString(result.String())
} else if readmeExist && !shouldRenderSource {
buf := &bytes.Buffer{}
@ -627,11 +631,11 @@ func renderFile(ctx *context.Context, entry *git.TreeEntry, treeLink, rawLink st
ctx.Data["MarkupType"] = markupType
var result strings.Builder
err := markup.Render(&markup.RenderContext{
Ctx: ctx,
Filename: blob.Name(),
URLPrefix: path.Dir(treeLink),
Metas: ctx.Repo.Repository.ComposeDocumentMetas(),
GitRepo: ctx.Repo.GitRepo,
Ctx: ctx,
RelativePath: ctx.Repo.TreePath,
URLPrefix: path.Dir(treeLink),
Metas: ctx.Repo.Repository.ComposeDocumentMetas(),
GitRepo: ctx.Repo.GitRepo,
}, rd, &result)
if err != nil {
ctx.ServerError("Render", err)

View file

@ -1161,6 +1161,13 @@ func RegisterRoutes(m *web.Route) {
m.Get("/*", context.RepoRefByType(context.RepoRefLegacy), repo.SingleDownload)
}, repo.MustBeNotEmpty, reqRepoCodeReader)
m.Group("/render", func() {
m.Get("/branch/*", context.RepoRefByType(context.RepoRefBranch), repo.RenderFile)
m.Get("/tag/*", context.RepoRefByType(context.RepoRefTag), repo.RenderFile)
m.Get("/commit/*", context.RepoRefByType(context.RepoRefCommit), repo.RenderFile)
m.Get("/blob/{sha}", context.RepoRefByType(context.RepoRefBlob), repo.RenderFile)
}, repo.MustBeNotEmpty, reqRepoCodeReader)
m.Group("/commits", func() {
m.Get("/branch/*", context.RepoRefByType(context.RepoRefBranch), repo.RefCommits)
m.Get("/tag/*", context.RepoRefByType(context.RepoRefTag), repo.RefCommits)